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Social Media and Protest Mobilization: 
Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, the political role of the Internet and digital social media has 
developed into a well-established topic of research on political communication and political 
participation. The Internet’s prominent role in the diffusion of popular protest across the 
Arab World and the ouster of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt has re-energized 
the debate on the implications of social media networks for political mobilization and 
patterns of protest diffusion, as well as the impact of social media networks on individual 
political engagement.  
Much research on these aspects of social media has hitherto been conducted in the context 
of consolidated Western democracies on forms of political participation that tend to support 
the political system. Work has been carried out on how Internet use can be used as a direct 
influence on actions of legitimate governments through affecting the decisions of elected 
officials or indirect influence through the selection of officials. Typical activities include 
conventional political participation (voting, donating money, canvassing, attending political 
meetings and electoral rallies, being interested in politics) and lawful unconventional 
participation (signing petitions, participating in authorized demonstrations and strikes, 
political consumerism).  
Political science literature argues there is a plausible positive relationship between an 
individual’s exposure to and use of digital media and the degree of his or her political 
engagement (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Social network platforms such as Twitter, 
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YouTube, and Facebook have multiplied the possibilities for retrieval and dissemination of 
political information, and thus afford the Internet user a variety of supplemental and 
relatively low cost access points to political information and engagement. Social media users 
can be updated about their friends’ political activities through their own News Feed. They 
can comment on these activities or join online discussion groups, which engage them in 
political conversation from the convenience of their homes at any time of the day. They can 
“befriend” political organizations online and stay informed about their activities without 
having to attend a meeting or a rally. In this way, the more social and interactive culture of 
online communication that developed with the emergence of the Web2.0 holds potential for 
the democratisation of political engagement.  
Digital media use has considerably lowered the transaction costs associated with political 
action; however, despite these positive attributes, its impact on individual participation rates 
has remained “underwhelming” (Bimber and Copeland 2011). A meta-analysis of 38 studies 
on the impact of Internet use on civic engagement between 1995 and 2005 confirms a 
positive but very modest impact (Boulianne 2009), which appears to be moderated by 
factors long established as standard predictors of political participation, such as social capital 
(Gibson, Howard, and Ward 2000) and political interest (Xenos and Moy 2007). At the meso-
level of social organization there is broad scholarly consensus that the Internet has 
expanded the ‘collective action repertoire’ of organizational actors, such as social 
movements and grassroots organizations (Geser 2001; Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Charles Tilly 2001; van Laer and van Aelst 2009).  The strategic toolkit of these actors has 
been complemented by the informal procedures that the Internet offers for mobilization. 
The structure of digital networks facilitates decentralized forms of campaigning based on 
parallel activities of independent individuals.  The task of information diffusion can be 
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delegated to a multitude of members who act as unpaid volunteers by circulating received 
messages throughout their personal networks. There are significant multiplier effects as 
users share information across their networks, expanding the reach and impact of 
information. The Internet has thus arguably become an important resource for political 
mobilization, which reduces the costs previously allocated to professional communication 
(Geser 2001; Krueger 2006). 
At the same time, the political implications of the Internet in the context of non-democratic 
systems remain relatively under researched, even though there is a widespread popular 
belief that the Internet can undermine authoritarian rule. Case study research from the 
Berkman Centre for Internet and Society investigates the impact of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) on civic engagement in authoritarian regimes 
(Chowdhury 2008; Goldstein 2007; Goldstein and Rotich 2008), as have several additional 
publications on the cases of Iran (Kelly and Etling 2008; Rahimi 2003; Tezcür 2012; Weitz 
2010) and China (Chen 2009). By means of a qualitative case study that analyses a 
convenience sample of news reports and social media messages produced over the course 
of the Egyptian uprisings (ELTANTAWY and Wiest 2011) come to the conclusion that social 
media introduced a novel resource that provided  swiftness in disseminating information; 
and helped to build and strengthen ties among Egyptian activists.  
By and large, however, the democratic transitions literature, however, is still a long way 
from having established a clear understanding of the relationship between new media and 
political participation and protest mobilization under authoritarian rule and the rich 
empirical data – particularly micro data - needed to establish such causal influences have yet 
to be gathered (Aday et al. 2010; Kalathil and Boas 2001; Lynch 1999). 
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The Tunisian uprising of 2010-2011 provides an excellent opportunity to address this 
research lacuna. Based on background talks with 16 Tunisian digital activists and a survey 
among 437 Tunisian Internet users conducted in early 2012, this article analyses the use of 
the Internet as a significant resource for protest mobilization in the case of Tunisia. Previous 
analyses of the Tunisian case show that early ‘tactical concessions’ (Gränzer 1999; Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) from the regime to a growing protest movement in the 1980s halted 
political reform and led to a deterioration in the human rights situation, making Tunisia a 
‘least likely’ case where protest would be possible to make a contribution to political 
transformation (Eckstein 1975; Landman 2008 ). Hence, there are good reasons to argue that 
political reform in Tunisia seemed unlikely; however, this article shows that the Internet 
significantly contributed to the wave of protest that brought down the Ben Ali regime. 
Drawing on insights from ‘resource mobilization theory’ (RMT), we show that social media 
(1) allowed for a ‘digital elite’ to break the national media blackout in Tunisia through 
brokering information for mainstream media; (2) provided an element of ‘emotional 
mobilization’ through depicting atrocities associated with the regime’s handling of the 
protests which, in turn, led to the formation of a national collective identity supportive of 
protest; (3) enabled intergroup collaboration that facilitated a large ‘cycle of protest’ to 
develop. 
In order to sustain this argument, the paper is divided into four sections. The first section 
outlines trends in social movement theory to show how Internet use and social media ‘fit’ in 
terms of explaining the contribution of new technologies to the kind of mobilization that 
took place in Tunisia in 2010 to 2011. The second section examines how a digital elite in 
Tunisia used new technologies to create networks and frame the mobilization against the 
regime, aggregate discontent across different opposition groups and overcome regime 
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5 
attempts to control the flow of information. The third section presents statistics drawn from 
the survey data to show how increased Internet use raised probabilities for Tunisians to 
become involved in anti-government protest. The final section draws tentative conclusions 
about the Internet and social media as a resource for protest mobilization more generally. 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
It has been argued that public protest under authoritarianism is rare (Tullock 2005), 
spontaneous, politically and geographically isolated, and will largely occur without 
coordination through organized social movements (Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Charles Tilly 2001; Tilly 2004))  In explaining the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, the 
political economy literature has consequently focused on the role of elites. It is argued that 
the most serious challengers of autocrats come from their own ruling coalitions, i.e. the 
military or security forces (Geddes 2003, 2006), the ruling party or coalition  (Boix and Svolik 
2008; Guriev and Sonin 2009; Magaloni 2008), or their royal families (Fjelde 2010; Kricheli, 
Livne, and Magaloni 2011)). Where attention is given to citizen groups, it is in relation how 
their support affects the interaction ‘game’ between elites from the government and 
opposition (Colomer 2011; Colomer and Pascual 1994; Przeworski 1991). Beyond the game-
theoretic literature, however, work on social movements has shown the possibility for 
popular mobilization under authoritarianism contribute to regime liberalization and 
democratic transformation e.g. (Foweraker 1989, 1995; Foweraker and Craig 1990; 
Foweraker and Landman 1997; Hawkins 2002; Landman 2008 ; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999).  
Not only does civilian-led anti-government protest occur under authoritarianism, but it can 
even spread across state boundaries through different processes of diffusion. Indeed, the 
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past three decades saw four cross-national waves of anti-regime mobilizations different 
regions of the world: (1) popular opposition and regime change in Latin America in the 1970s 
and 1980s; (2) the spread of popular challenges to communist party rule in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991; (3) the ‘colour’ revolutions of post-communist 
Europe and Eurasia from 1996 to 2005; and (4) the protests in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). Other cases of popular but less successful anti-authoritarian protest include 
the Tiananmen Square Protests in China in 1989, the Student Revolt in Indonesia in 1998, the 
Saffron Revolution in Myanmar in 2007, and the Green Movement in Iran in 2009 and 2010.   
Studies that examine why social movement arise in the first place focus their attention on 
sources of collective grievance and common identities that lead to popular mobilization and 
protest (see, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Hendrix, Haggard et al. 2009). Studies that 
examine how social movements attract participants and members to take part in their 
activities focus on the role of social movement organisations (SMOs) and the mobilization of 
important resources that are necessary for sustained collective actions, such as money, 
communications, membership, and the provision of ‘selective incentives’ to overcome the 
problem of collective action (see e.g. Lichbach 1998; Putnam and Fieldstein 2003). Studies 
that focus on the impact of social movements focus on their goals, their legal and 
institutional impact (including regime change), and the degree to which values and political 
behaviour have been altered by prolonged periods of social movement activity. 
This article explains how social movements can attract participants for collective action 
against an authoritarian regime that has been challenged unsuccessfully in the past. We 
show that in Tunisia, there was a latent desire to form collective movements under 
conditions of grievance. Particularly, we focus the role of new technologies as a significant 
resource for protest mobilization. We demonstrate that the Internet provided the means for 
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7 
aggregating grievance, building networks across disparate communities within Tunisia and 
communicating strategies for successful opposition to the Ben Ali regime.  
While it would be incorrect to say there is no public sphere under authoritarianism 
(Foweraker and Landman 1997) the ability for civil society to mobilize collective action 
around grievances is made more difficult by the fact that the national narrative is often 
controlled by the government which typically resorts to a mix of censorship and intimidation 
to suppress negative information about its performance. By providing a space for increased 
free speech, the Internet poses an existential threat to the ability of authoritarian 
governments to control the national narrative (Kuebler 2011). Ordinary citizens, not 
necessarily linked to any political movement, may share their grievances by voicing them 
through online social networks, and once such information is leaked to the public it may 
unleash effects at two different levels. At the micro level, it can act as a cognitive catalyst 
that pushes people into protest action. At the macro level, media content that evokes 
negative emotions has a high potential to “go viral”, where anger and anxiety as emotional 
states of heightened physiological arousal are key in driving social transmission and diffusion 
(Berger and Milkman 2010). 
The limited supply of information under authoritarian conditions means that individuals can 
expect to pay high personal costs (arrest, incarceration, or death on streets) if they 
participate in unsuccessful protest activity that results from the lack of coordination and 
sharing of information. The key challenge for the formation of protest under authoritarian 
regimes is that potential protesters will only turn out to protest if they are convinced that a 
large number of others will do the same (Hendrix, Haggard, and Magaloni 2009). Social 
networks provide individuals with information that allows for a better calculation of their  
‘individual risk threshold’ (Granovetter 1978) in two important ways. First, online content 
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8 
that documents past protest events may trigger informational cascades that lead to mass 
civil uprisings. Second, event management features (e.g. “Facebook events”) offered by 
social networking sites inform users about the prospective participation in upcoming events. 
 
The potential of new technologies to enhance the ability of ordinary people to share 
information of consequence should be understood in terms of Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT). RMT claims that open and affluent societies provide more favourable conditions for 
contentious groups to thrive, thus making protest more common (Dalton and van Sickle 
2005). Here, the existence of extensive non-governmental organizations and other civil 
society groups provide the crucial variable linking dissatisfaction to political action, as they 
allow citizens to engage in a variety of voluntary associations freely and to develop the 
necessary social and organizational skills to promote their interests  (Putnam 2000; Putnam 
and Feldstein 2003). Such groups are able to raise funds, increase membership, and engage 
in communication and awareness-raising strategies to bring about their goals. During times 
of political stress, such groups of disparate social movement organizations can come 
together in larger ‘cycles of protest’ to challenge the regime on significant policy issues 
(Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and C.   Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1994). In accounts of social 
movements in more open societies, studies that adopt the RMT framework focus on how 
elites in the opposition work through networks and social movement organisations (SMOs) 
to harness a collection of resources that help aggregate grievances and take advantage of 
the changing political opportunity structures that can emerge during a cycle of protest (e.g. a 
shift in elite alignments, critical elections, exogenous economic shocks, etc.).  
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9 
While the occurrence of protest in closed authoritarian societies may appear to run counter 
to the basic premises of RMT, many authoritarian societies have the presence of latent 
networks, proto-organisations and community leaders (or at least those that have not been 
arrested, exiled or ‘disappeared’), all of which can provide the basis for social mobilisation. 
The advent of the Internet builds on ever denser communication infrastructures as societies 
develop and provides a resource for movement leaders that can be used to orchestrate 
protest where institutional distrust looms large and civic activism is systematically 
suppressed. Internet use can coincide with participatory dynamics characterized less by 
formal organizational relationships and more by loosely-knit personal networks increasingly 
mediated through electronic communication (Wellman et al. 2003). The availability of 
Internet communication technologies can enable activist groups to communicate with 
potential constituencies across large distances, including diaspora communities living 
outside the country in question. Thus, they constitute important resources to achieve 
intergroup-collaboration and challenge the strategies of social isolation typically employed 
by authoritarian regimes to obstruct civil society groups from forming and operating..   
 
In addition to the idea of the Internet as a resource, the emergence of new technologies can 
also be seen as way in which potential protesters are targeted by ‘recruitment agents’ who 
inform them of upcoming protest events and encourage their participation (see Snow, 
Zurcher, et al. 1980). The most infuriated and risk-acceptant citizen will not be able to 
participate in an anti-government demonstration if he or she does not know a 
demonstration event is actually taking place. The likelihood of a person to become mobilized 
increases with their network ‘embeddedness’ and movement leaders can use such 
embeddness to help recruit larger numbers of participants.  Overlapping memberships allow 
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10 
information about upcoming protest events to travel beyond the boundaries of a network of 
hard-core activists and ‘spill over’ to networks of less-engaged citizens (Carroll and Ratner 
1996). Another important function of social networks in this context is to build a collective 
identity supportive of protest action, which is achieved through interpersonal conversations 
with other network members. Collective identities motivate protest participation by 
providing the potential participant with a sense of in-group solidarity and an oppositional 
consciousness of “us” versus “them” (Friedman and McAdam 1992; van Laer 2011). 
It can thus be assumed that the Internet is conducive to increased awareness about 
collective action events, such as mass demonstrations of the kind observed during the Arab 
Spring. The more embedded an individual Internet user is in terms of memberships in 
different online social networks, the higher should be the likelihood of him or her being 
targeted by an online mobilization attempt, which as we shall see, was increasingly  
coordinated by a digital elite that could collate, translate, and communicate disparate nodes 
of grievance in the country in ways that galvanised a more national focussed critique of the 
Ben Ali regime.  
 
Taken together, this article is concerned with how interaction between aggrieved individuals 
was enhanced through new technologies, and how new technologies contributed to the 
wave of protest mobilization in Tunisia. We argue that aggrieved individuals under 
authoritarian regimes face additional challenges that for successful mobilization, and that 
the Internet and social media provide a resource to meet some of these challenges. In a 
country like Tunisia with an authoritarian regime, disparate communities with varied 
dialects, and a lack of shared information, the Internet provided access to information, 
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11 
lowered transaction costs, buttressed networks of activists and contributed to anti-
government mobilization particularly after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 
December 2011.  
 
In order to examine the contribution of new technologies to protest mobilization in Tunisia, 
we use three main empirical sources: (1) the relevant secondary literature, (2) a series of 
background talks conducted with 16 cyber activists and citizen journalists during a field trip 
to Tunis in October 2011, and (3) data from an online survey among Tunisian Facebook users 
conducted between 1 March and 31 May 2012.  For the background talks, the activists were 
asked to provide information about their own online and offline protest activities prior to 
and during the uprising, to describe the nature of digital activist networks in Tunisia and 
their own position in these structures, to provide a personal assessment of the contribution 
of ICT to the protest movement, and to help identify online contents which they regarded as 
having been particularly influential.
1
  For the survey data we used the online software 
SurveyMonkey, where the survey contained a total of 34 questions and took about 12 
minutes to complete. It was conducted in Arabic and was pilot-tested for 
comprehensiveness and ease of use among native Tunisian-Arabic speakers prior to its 
launch.  
                                                            
1
 . Interview partners included independent bloggers, bloggers for digital formats of traditional media outlets, 
and activists belonging to diverse networks such as the collective Blog Nawaat, the self-described “cyber think 
tank” Takriz  - which maintains close ties to the Anonymous cyber movement and radical ultra groups of 
Tunisia’s football fan-scene, as well as members of the Tunisian Pirate Party, which at that time had not yet 
been officially recognized as political party. Political activism in times of regime transformation comes with 
uncertainties for those who engage in it. This is especially true where activists have been socialized in the 
political culture of a recently toppled authoritarian regime with the outcome of the transition process 
remaining unclear. Such was the situation during the field trip for this study, which was undertaken in the week 
leading up to Tunisia’s first democratic election following the ouster of President Ben Ali. Taking into account 
the diverging risk perceptions of interview partners, the information given by them was therefore subsumed 
into the narrative of the case study, unless they explicitly agreed to their identity being revealed.  
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12 
Participation in the survey was promoted using a respondent-driven sampling technique.
2
 To 
build the sample, we formed an online group on Facebook dedicated to the discussion of the 
role of the social media in the Arab Spring and invited those cyber activists to join the group 
to which contacts had been established during the field. The group was then systematically 
enlarged using the Facebook friendship suggestion algorithm whereby the network 
recommends new friends to its users on the basis of their existing friends. Once the survey 
had been launched, an invitation to participate was sent to members of this group using the 
Facebook group event organizing function. The invitation message contained the survey’s 
URL, a description of its academic purpose, and suggested to circulate the survey URL among 
friends, relatives and colleagues. No monetary or material incentive was offered to the 
respondents. The survey resulted in 437 responses; a non-random sample which provides 
valuable insights into a subset of Tunisian citizens previously shown to have been well 
educated, digitally literate, and socially interconnected (see Annex 1).  
  
                                                            
2
 The method applied here is similar to the chain-referral sampling methods which have hitherto primarily been 
used to contact hidden or difficult-to-reach populations such as drug users or sex workers (Salganik and 
Heckathorn 2004) While the “pass-along effect” (Norman and Russell 2006) involved with this technique is 
helpful in increasing sample size and reducing the transaction cost of response collection, it is often criticized 
because respondents are not randomly selected from a known sample frame and this limitation risks biasing 
the sample and diminishing the generalizability of inferential statistical tests. While acknowledging that these 
threats are real, as the online population has grown and the Internet has become more embedded in everyday 
life, it has become increasingly common for social scientific inquiries to proceed with samples derived through 
this process (Kaye and Johnson 1999). 
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13 
DIGITAL ELITE AND THE AGGREGATION OF DISCONTENT 
During the 1990s, governments in the Muslim world adopted strategies to regulate the use 
of ICTs that varied across regime type. In liberal regimes competition in the ICT-market was 
permitted, while in more autocratic regimes ICT development was controlled by state owned 
companies, which reported directly to the government and monitored online content 
(Howard 2011). Tunisia was somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.  Starting from the 
middle of the 1990s, President Ben Ali’s administration invested heavily in the telecom 
sector. Within a decade, Tunisia had one of the most developed telecommunications 
infrastructures in Northern Africa. Competition between eleven Internet service providers 
led to one of the most develop d Internet markets in the region (Reporters Without Borders 
2004). By 2008 there were 1.7 million internet users out of a total population of 10.2 million, 
who could access the Internet from their homes and / or work, as well as from public 
Internet centres (publinets) set up throughout the country. Ben Ali’s strategy to depict 
himself as a role model for the promotion of ICTs in the developing world sold well 
internationally when in 2001, Tunisia was chosen to host the second stage of the UN-World 
Summit on the Information Society in 2005.  
 
Government censorship activities 
Despite its positive international image, the Ben Ali regime went at great lengths to control 
and censor communication on the Web.  Under the pretext of preventing access to material 
contrary to public order and morality,  the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI), was legally 
authorized  to intercept email messages. Since the ATI was the gateway from which all of 
Tunisia’s Internet Service Providers (ISPs) leased their bandwidth the agency was also able to 
monitoring software onto their servers (OpenNet Inititative 2009). While the ATI tried to 
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conceal its censorship activities, the somewhat clumsy practice of generating  fake 404 “File 
not found” error messages for blocked websites soon gained the agency the nickname 
“Ammar 404”
1
. In addition, the ATI exercised control by obliging private Internet café 
owners and the publinets to register the ID numbers of Internet users and by holding them 
legally responsible for their customers’ online activities.   
 
Online censorship  was stepped up considerably in 2008 in response to strikes and 
demonstrations against corruption of the Phosphate Mining Company (Compagnie 
Phosphate de GafsaI) in the region of Gafsa. While state-controlled media ignored the 
events, Internet activists began to cover them on Facebook. In August 2008 Facebook was 
blocked at the request of Ben Ali who cited national security violations by terrorists 
(Chomiak 2011; International Crisis Group 2011), but after considerable online protest the 
government lifted the blockade a few weeks later and switched to a strategy of covert 
surveillance of the social network. According to The U.S. State Department and the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the government ordered Tunisian ISPs to intercept 
the log-in details of Tunisian Facebook users and relay them to the ATI which then used 
them to either block the accounts entirely or remove undesired content (Lister 2011).  
 
Cyber-activism 1998 – 2010  
Cyber activism in Tunisia is a phenomenon that long predates the Arab Spring. As early as 
1998, two anonymous activists named “Foetus” and “Waterman” founded the group Takriz
2
, 
described as a “cyber think and street resistance network”. From its beginnings, the group 
clearly targeted the country’s politically alienated youth as its core audience through a 
combination of aggressive street slang and irreverent mockery of the authorities, which soon 
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caught the regime's attention. Takriz's website was blocked within Tunisia in August 2000, 
but soon other sites sprang up to take its place. The collective blog Nawaat
3
, co-founded in 
2004 by the exiled activists Riadh Guerfali and Sami Ben Gharbia,  sought to provide a public 
platform for Tunisian dissident voices and publish information about the regime’s corruption 
and human rights violations.  
Other digital activists started out with cultural or entertainment topics and became 
politicized along the way in reaction to the regime’s increasing repressiveness. Lina Ben 
Mhenni, a lecturer in linguistics at the University of Tunis, started out reporting on the 
capital’s club scene on her blog Nightclubbeuse, but from 2009 increasingly reported on 
social and political issues which led the authorities to block her site in early 2010. The re-
launched version of her blog A Tunisian Girl adopted a decidedly political tone that won her 
several journalism awards as well as a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in 2011 for the 
courageous documentation of the regime’s human rights violations.  
These examples show that a political culture of dissent existed prior to the events of 
December 2010. The Internet provided an alternative public sphere that was at least 
partially shielded from the government’s unilateral oversight and control. Tunisians were 
able to form solidarities through shared feelings of repression and humiliation and to 
formulate a collective alternative discourse (Chomiak 2011; International Crisis Group 2011). 
Tunisia’s cyber avant-garde, however,  was dominated by affluent, well educated, and 
polyglot individuals with a high degree of cultural capital (Lim 2013) - a social profile 
characteristic for early ICT adopters throughout the developing world (Norris 2001). Yet it 
would be inaccurate to dismiss their network as a socially exclusive club. The early opening 
of the telecom market to free competition had considerably reduced the cost of Internet 
access, such that Internet use was not the privilege only of the economic elite  (Howard 
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2011). However, the ability for bloggers to convey their political messages to a critical mass 
of citizens was thwarted by tight control from the Ben Ali regime. According to Kuebler 
(2011), this limited impact of blogging between the late 1990s and 2010 can be attributed to 
its failure to build “the bridge from an elitist medium to the general public sphere”. As 
illustrated in Table 3, prior to the Revolution traffic on the websites of Tunisian blogger 
communities such as Nawaat originated mainly from the host countries of sizeable Tunisian 
diaspora communities.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Digital activists had thus stepped-up their efforts to connect with both international and  
domestic constituencies. Several core activists started to become active in international 
blogger communities, such as Global Voices,
4
 to increase their visibility abroad. Some 
received training in e-journalism from programs funded through the US Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which focused on training journalists throughout North Africa 
and the Middle East in the years leading up to 2010.
5
  
 
Protest ‘Ignited’: 17 December – late December 2010 
The event that finally undid the ability of Ben Ali’s security apparatus to control the public 
sphere occurred in the marginalized provincial town of Sidi Bouzid southwest of Tunis. On 17 
December 2011, distress triggered by socioeconomic, generational and geographic 
disparities within Tunisia’s many governates was epitomized by the self-immolation of 
Mohammed Bouazizi. The 26 year-old fruit seller set himself on fire after a female police 
officer had confiscated his wares because he did not have a vendor’s permit and publicly 
humiliated him by slapping him in the face. By committing his desperate act in front of the 
office of the regional governor, Bouazizi forced the regime to assume political and moral 
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responsibility for his situation, thus turning him into the symbolic representative of millions 
of young Tunisians who lacked the opportunity for socio-economic advancement (Aday et al. 
2010; Lynch 2012). The same day, members of Bouazizi’s family, accompanied by trade 
unionists, marched to the police headquarters to express their anger. The protests soon 
turned into violent clashes between the police forces and members of Bouazizi’s extended 
family, neighbors and youth who identified with his plight. Within a week, the protests 
spilled over to several neighboring cities. However, unlike in Gafsa two years earlier, the 
regime failed to contain the uprising and limit its ability to spread beyond the region. By the 
time Bouazizi died in hospital from his injuries on 4 January, what had begun as a local, 
socio-economically, motivated protest had turned into a nationwide anti-regime movement 
with tens of thousands of Tunisians from all levels of society demanding Ben Ali’s fall. 
Bouazizi’s death provided the necessary collective frame of reference to propel the online 
anti-regime movement onto the Tunisian street. But how did this information manage to 
break the filter of state-controlled media to reach such a broad audience so quickly? 
 
One answer lies in the way that the online networks that had developed previously 
interacted with traditional international media outlets. Previous analyses of the Internet’s 
role in the context of the Egyptian revolution (e.g. Aouragh and Alexander 2011) warn 
against interpretations that isolate the Internet form other with which the  formed powerful 
synergies. The same holds true for the case of Tunisia: The initial protests in Sidi Bouzid were 
recorded by participants with cell phone video cameras and posted on personal Facebook 
profiles. On the eve of the revolution, Facebook penetration still hovered around a modest 
17% (Dubai School of Government 2011). It is unlikely that this information would have 
reached a mass audience had it not been for a small elite of digital activists, many of them 
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operating from exile, who acted as information brokers. Around the globe, these activists 
now joined efforts to screen Facebook for protest related posts, translating the material,
6
 
and structuring it into a coherent narrative, as Yassine Ayari explains:  
When the revolution came I was in Belgium. At that time I was already 
known through my blog. I had 2000 or 3000 friends on Facebook which 
gave me a little bit of influence. So I took a vacation from my job and sat 
with three other friends, PCs, pizzas, and a telephone. We tried to use all 
the information we could handle: status updates, pictures, videos. When 
we heard that something happened in Kasserine or somewhere else, we'd 
pick up the phone, we’d know someone who knows someone and we 
would find the information and post it (Yassine Ayari)
7
 
 
Networks like Global Voices and Nawaat started to run special online features covering the 
protests and spread the word through their own social media channels on Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube.  Once the information had been made available in a publishable form, 
international broadcasters were able to pick it up and re-import it into the country, thus 
‘leapfrogging’ the blackout imposed by Tunisian state-media gatekeepers. Social media 
footage about the Sidi Bouzid protests first appeared on Al Jazeera on 20th December 2010.
8
 
It was only through this complex threefold interaction between non-elite protesters, 
strategically oriented digital activists, and international broadcasters that the information 
about the death of Bouazizi and the ensuing protests were able to reach a larger portion of 
the Tunisian society.  
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Protest escalation and regime collapse: late December 2010 – 14 January 2011 
Over the second week of the conflict, the movement expanded both socially and politically. 
Unemployed youth, who had so far been the socially dominant group among the protesters, 
were joined by employed professional and occupational group. The National Bar Association 
and the regional branches of the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) emerged as 
poles of contestation, giving the movement both structure and sustainability (International 
Crisis Group 2011; Lynch 2012; Saidani 2012 ). Politically, the movement radicalized with 
socio-economic demands rapidly transforming into overt challenges to the regime, most 
clearly expressed by the slogan Ben Ali dégage!
9
  
 
The regime responded with increased repression on the one hand, and an almost complete 
breakdown in public communication on the other hand. Between the 8th and 10th of 
January, police violence resulted in the deaths of 50 protesters according to union and 
hospital sources (International Crisis Group 2011). Ben Ali had only addressed the nation in a 
first televised speech on 28
th
 December, promising to respond to the protesters’ demands. 
Thereafter, almost two weeks elapsed before in a second speech on 10
th
 January he 
promised to create 300.000 jobs over the next two years, but at the same time condemned 
the protests as “terrorist acts” orchestrated by foreign interests. These delayed and 
disconnected reactions from the regime stood in harsh contrast to a realit  that had become 
visible for all to see through social media, and significantly contributed to transforming a 
spontaneous and locally-rooted movement into a determined national revolution.  
 
Towards the end of December 2010, web activists from the capital had begun to travel to 
the remote regions of the country to cover the events and transmit them through Facebook 
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real- time videos. Although Al-Jazeera had only one correspondent based in country and its 
Tunis office had been shut down (Lynch 2012), the TV channel could now draw on a wealth 
of footage circulating on the web which it broadcasted into Tunisian households without an 
Internet connection. One video with particular impact was recorded by a medical student at 
the emergency ward of the Kasserine municipal hospital
10
 
You could see people had been killed, their heads blown up […] Videos 
like this are shocking, but that’s what good about them. Because many 
Tunisians did not have a problem with Ben Ali. They said: “we’re ok, 
we are not poor we have food, we have hotels, we have beaches… it’s 
ok. Where is the problem!?” But when you show them stuff like this 
they radically change their point of view about the system (Haythem El 
Mekki). 
11
 
 
During the final days of the uprising, an important function of the Internet consisted in 
helping to overcome the collective action problem associated with protest under 
authoritarian regimes. Reports about large scale demonstrations helped many Tunisians to 
overcome the barrier of fear that had so far prevented them from taking offline action. On 
12
th
 January the UGTT called for a rally in Sfax. With about 30,000 people in the streets, the 
city witnessed the largest demonstration prior to the fall of Ben Ali and is considered the 
revolution’s point of no return:  
 
Everyone who saw the video about the demonstration in Sfax said: if 
this has happened in Sfax then it can happen in Tunis. And if it happens 
in Tunis then it will be a success (Sara Ben Hamadi)
12
.  
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On 13 January, Ben Ali delivered his last televised speech, in which he announced that he 
would abstain from running as a presidential candidate in 2014 and offered to call for early 
parliamentary elections. It was too little too late. According to Schraeder and Redissi (2011), 
especially students and young people under 30 felt reluctant to grant the regime another 
four years to craft an authoritarian transition. Many of them saw the mass demonstrations 
staged for 14
th
January in the centre of Tunis as a unique opportunity of their generation to 
break with a tradition of quiescent obedience and considered participation in these protests 
as a patriotic duty.  It also appears that social media were a crucial element in the 
politicization and mobilization of the young urban middle class and elites. As Nadia Zouari, a 
Tunis based plastic artist and feuilletonist for Le Temps, remembers the final days leading up 
to the regime’s fall
13
:  
During this period we spent white nights in front of the computer. 
Facebook connected us to the things that were going on and it felt like 
we were living in a different country. Because in Tunis you could lead a 
normal life. But in Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine and Kef it was totally 
different. And when we saw what was happening to people there we 
decided that we had to show solidarity with them.  
 
Religious political actors seem to share this interpretation of the Internet’s role in mobilizing 
urban middle classes. In an interview by the International Crisis Group (2011) a member of 
the moderate Islamist Ennahda party states: “The internet caused the failure, to all of our 
surprise, of the regime’s project of creating a consumerist and apolitical middle class”. It 
appears then, that another important role of Facebook and other social media was to span a 
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bridge between hitherto unrelated socio-economic groups, thus providing the basis for 
intergroup collaboration that facilitated a large cycle of protest to develop.  On 14th January, 
confronted with the largest anti-government demonstration that Tunis had ever seen, Ben 
Ali and his family fled the country on a plane to Dubai. 
 
THE INTERNET AND MOBILISATION: SURVEY EVIDENCE 
These developments in the provision, restriction and use of the ICTs in Tunisia, as well as the 
strong anecdotal evidence from our interviews suggest that the internet and social media 
contributed to the downfall of the Ben Ali Regime.  In this final empirical section, we analyse 
the results of our online survey to show that indeed respondents who were more active 
internet users were significantly more likely to engage in anti-government protest activity. 
Our analysis proceeds by looking at the frequency of responses across questions in the 
survey that capture internet uses, attitudes towards the Ben Ali regime and the likelihood to 
become involved in anti-government protest activity. We then show how we constructed a 
scale of internet use and a scale of likelihood to engage in political protest activity. With 
these two scales, we engage in a simple bivariate analysis and then move on to an ordered-
probit multiple regression analysis to examine the importance of Internet use for protest 
mobilization in the presence of additional explanatory variables. 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. The survey reveals a 
complex mix of attitudes to the Ben Ali regime itself and offers different measures of 
attitudes that variously map onto the main theoretical concepts outlined above. There are 
several questions on government capacity to run the country, where two dimensions of 
attitudes relating to managing the economy and protecting rights and freedoms emerged. 
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For managing the economy, we collapsed four questions on the economy, jobs, income 
distribution and corruption into a scale, where the frequency of the respondents in our 
sample with strong opposition to the regime is high (i.e. they strongly disagreed across all 
four questions relating to government capacity in that issue area).  For rights and freedoms, 
we collapsed three questions relating to freedom of speech, freedom of the press and 
general respect for people’s rights under the Ben Ali, where the frequency of opposition 
again is very high. We see high response rates and good variation across all the components 
of the two composite scores. Figure 1 shows both scales of opposition among the 
respondents, where higher scores on the scale show greater levels of discontent. 
Figure 1 about here 
In addition to these general levels of opposition to the regime, 59.5% of the sample 
expressed anger, sadness and frustration over online pictures and videos that documented 
the regime’s heavy handed response to opposition activities and made them doubt the 
legitimacy of the regime itself. These attitudes were joined with a general level of national 
pride in opposing the regime, where 93.5% agreed strongly or agreed that as Tunisians they 
needed to support the protest movement and 96.1% agreed strongly or agreed that the 
events filled them with a sense of pride about being Tunisian
3
. These findings emphasize the 
Internet’s role as a transmitter of emotions that contribute to the formation of collective 
                                                            
3
 In an open ended survey on social media use conducted among 50 Tunisians Esseghaier (2013) 
observed similar motifs  with respondents reporting a sense of unity, solidarity, pride, and 
connection.  The respondents discussed a sense of unity, solidarity, pride, and connection, fostered 
through the physical demonstrations. - See more at: http://wi.mobilities.ca/tweeting-out-a-tyrant-
social-media-and-the-tunisian-revolution/#sthash.nXQaMhxS.dpuf
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identities supportive of protest action – a function that has long been regarded as essential 
by attitudinal and network approaches to political activism (Friedman and McAdam 1992; 
Jasper and Poulsen 1995, van Laer 2011).  
 
In terms of intergroup collaboration it is interesting that 73% of respondents reported that in 
order to keep informed about what was happening, they started to connect with people on 
social networks that they had not previously known. 73.8% of respondents had learned 
through the Internet that a large number of people had signed up for a demonstration in 
their own town, city or municipality. Combined, these two findings indicate that social media 
may indeed have facilitated a spillover effect whereby protest information filters from the 
networks of political activists into those of less-engaged citizens (Carroll and Ratner 1996) .  
In rationalist terms it is interesting that 80.4% of the sample ‘agreed strongly’ or ‘agreed’ to 
the statement that based on what they saw on the Internet they came to believe that the 
protest movement would achieve its goal of bringing down the Ben Ali government. 82.2% 
agreed strongly or agreed that from what they were able to see on the Internet, the number 
of people involved in the protests outnumbered those who supported the regime.  At the 
same time the majority of respondents were conscious of the risks involved with protest 
action:  81.9% felt that their participation in protests could result in injury, arrest or other 
forms of repression. While this could have resulted in a lack of incentive to personally 
participate in protest action, the results also indicate that the free rider effect may have 
been outweighed by feelings of personal efficacy and in-group solidarity as 53.6% felt that 
they could make a positive and 92% agreed strongly or agreed that they had a lot in common 
with those involved in the protests.   
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Network embededness among respondents was high with 65.1% of the sample indicating to 
have more 200 friends in their primary online social network. Membership in popular social 
network sites varied across Facebook (98.4%), YouTube (46.4%), Twitter (42.7%), LinkedIn 
(23.0%), Dailymotion (13.7%), Flickr (7.4%) and Vimeo (7.1%).
14
 But did the use of the 
internet and participation in social media contribute to mobilization for protest? 
To address this fundamental question, we combined several related questions into two 
scales. First, we combined seven questions on the frequency of use of the Internet for 
protest-related activities, which include questions relating to online discussion of the 
political situation with known and unknown people, online searches for information on local 
and national protest events, and the use of the Internet to share information within Tunisia 
as well as to international audiences
15
. Second we combined four questions on offline 
political behavior during the revolution, including such activities as participating in 
demonstrations; leafleting, wearing clothing, buttons or stickers with political messages; or 
discussing politics face to face. Figure 2 shows both scales, where it is clear that there is a 
cumulative frequency for respondents who used the internet for protest-related activity, 
while their cumulative frequency of political activity tends toward the lower end of the scale. 
Despite the difference in engagement between on-line and off-line activities, our analysis 
shows that there is a significant relationship between internet activity and the participation 
in protest activity. 
Figure 2 about here 
 
As a first look at the relationship between internet use and protest activity, we present a 
cross-tabulation based on dichotomizing both scales and comparing frequency counts for 
low and high internet use against low and high protest activity. The cross-tabulation (Figure 
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3) shows that respondents with low internet use were less engaged in protest activity than 
those respondents with high internet use (compare the shaded areas), where the difference 
in percentages is statistically significant (χ2 = 17.767; p < .001). Such bivariate results, 
however, need to take into account additional explanatory variables to check the degree to 
which internet use is indeed related to protest activity.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
To this end, we tested a series of increasingly complex models using ordered-probit multiple 
regression, which is the best statistical estimator given the ordinal scale that we created for 
political protest activity.
16
 Our dependent variable is the scale for level of protest activity and 
our independent variables variously include the level of internet use, a scale for opposition 
to the Ben Ali regime to be read as an indicator of socio-economic and political grievance, a 
scale for political efficacy, a scale for support for liberal religious views, level of education, 
occupational status, age and gender. The results for six models are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Reading across the different models, the results show that protest-related Internet use is 
positively and significantly related to increased offline protest activity among the 
respondents, even after controlling for an increasing number of additional independent 
variables. There are other findings of note alongside the main finding for Internet use. First, 
across models 2 to 6, opposition to the Ben Ali regime also contributes to the probability of 
becoming involved in protest activity – a finding that goes in line with previous research on 
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the effect of attitudinal and opinion issues on protest behavior (Lowrance 2006; Pierce and 
Converse 1990). Second, across models 3 to 6 a weak sense of political efficacy lowers the 
probability of engaging in political protest activity. This finding fits in with the recent revival 
of personality as an explanatory variable for political behavior in social science research 
(Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). John et. al. (2011) for instance demonstrate that  people 
with an internal locus of control are significantly more likely to start a mobilization. Third, 
across models 4 to 6 support for more conservative religious views lowers the probability of 
involvement in protest activity. This is interesting since it supports the notion that despite 
the success of the Islamist Ennahda party in the October 2011 elections the protest 
movement was essentially borne by the secular segments of Tunisia’s society (Lynch 2012; 
Noueihed and Warren 2012). 
 
CONCLUSION: THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA AS A RESOURCE 
This article has shown how the use of the Internet and social media in Tunisia contributed to 
the mobilization of anti-government protests with a particular focus on those who were 
digitally active. The paper has made clear that Tunisia’s early commitment to ICT 
infrastructure development (somewhat unwittingly) created an essential resource for the 
mobilization of nation-wide anti-regime protests. Increased frustration at the absence of 
socio-economic opportunity coupled with increasing exercise of government restrictions on 
internet use for political purposes provided the conditions from which significant cyber-
activism was made possible. Digital elites traded on past examples of cyber activism, 
aggregated stories of government abuse and used technology to bypass state authorities to 
broadcast images and narratives about the Ben Ali regime that provided the information 
basis upon which movement activists were able to build. Internet use and social media 
Page 27 of 46
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fdem  Email: Aurel.Croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de;Jeffhaynes106868@aol.com
Democratization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
28 
helped overcome censorship barriers to information and provided a significant resource for 
individuals to calculate their ‘risk threshold’ and respond to the growing sense of crisis. The 
internet and social media contributed to transcend geographical and socio-economic 
disparities and provided the basis to construct a national collective identity supportive of 
protest action against an increasingly unpopular regime. In this way, the internet served as 
the foundation for the articulation and aggregation of grievance, and acted as a significant 
resource that helped overcome problems of collective action and foment a successful 
protest movement that resulted in regime change. Our narrative analysis based on the 
background interviews and secondary sources showed how digital elite was able to use the 
existing infrastructure to bypass government controls and build support for a broader 
opposition movement. Our quantitative analysis showed consistent and overlapping 
opposition to the regime and a continuum of internet use that were translated into a greater 
propensity for engaging in political protest activity. In this way, we think it is plausible to 
conclude that the Internet makes a significant contribution to protest mobilization and in 
particular under authoritarian rule offers a route for overcoming collective action problems 
in ways that can galvanize opposition to unsavory regimes.  
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Endnotes 
                                                            
1
 Censor 404 
2
 Tunisian slang expression, roughly equivalent to ”bollocks“ or ”don’t break my balls”. 
3
 The core 
4
 http://globalvoicesonline.org/ 
5
 http://mepi.state.gov/ 
6
 Translation was essential given that many Tunisian users post in Derya, the Tunisian dialect 
which is barely comprehensive to non-Tunisian Arabic speakers.  
7
 Yassine Ayari, blogger and cyber-activist, interview conducted in Tunis, 18
th
 October 2011 
8
 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122063745828931.html 
9
 Ben Ali step down! 
10
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPr8ENP-zeE, 
11
 Haythem El Mekki, blogger and political commentator on TV channel El Watanayah, 
interview conducted in Tunis,  17 October 2011.  
12
 Sara Ben Hamadi, Blogger for Arte TV, interview conducted in Tunis, 19 October 2011. 
13
 Nadia Zouari, Interview conducted in Tunis, 17 October 2011.  
14
 The total is greater than 100% as respondents have multiple accounts. 
15
 Respondents were offered three frequency options ranging from never (1) to frequently 
(4) 
16
 Ordered probit calculates the degree to which independent variables raise the probability 
of a respondent moving into higher levels on an ordinal scale. 
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Table 1: Country Traffic for Nawaat.org prior to January 2011 
Country Pageviews Users 
Canada 85.9% 43.6% 
France 2.8% 11.3% 
Morocco 2.0% 7.7% 
Other 9.4% 37.5% 

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Table 2: Descriptive summaries for the key variables from the on-line survey
Annex 2 provides further details on these variables. 
 
 Variable name Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
No of valid 
observations 
Offline protest activities Polact  
(composite measure) 
3 16 2.933 323 
Disspolfrnds 1 4 0.723 322 
Worepolbadge 1 4 1.094 318 
Distpollit 1 4 1.153 318 
Partdem 1 4 1.006 320 
      
Internet used for protest 
activities 
Internetusepro 
(composite measure) 
3 28 5.343 350 
dispolknown2 1 4 0.766 345 
dispolstrangers2 1 4 1.128 341 
infosearch2 1 4 0.768 341 
iocalinfosearch2 1 4 0.837 344 
infosharefriends2 1 4 0.938 339 
infosharestrngrstunis2 1 4 1.188 336 
infoshareoutside2 1 4 1.169 338 
      
Opposition to Ben Ali regime Govsup 
(composite measure) 
1 16 2.274 436 
Govmanecon 1 4 0.819 435 
Govmakjobs 1 4 0.660 430 
Govredist 1 4 0.559 428 
Govanticorr 1 4 0.443 429 
      
Respect for rights and 
freedoms 
Rightsscale 
(composite measure) 
3 16 2.154 435 
Govprotspch 1 4 0.500 433 
Govpropress 1 4 0.445 423 
Polrespct 1 4 0.830 429 
Polresrights 1 4 0.661 435 
      
Weak sense of political 
efficacy before revolution 
Polefficprerev 
(composite measure) 
4 12 1.874 404 
Prerevpoleff 1 4 0.770 403 
Prerevwellinf 1 4 0.973 399 
Prerevdiscuss 1 4 0.690 395 
      
Support for conservative 
religious views 
Religviews 
(composite measure) 
2 18 3.957 308 
relinoff2 1 4 1.119 306 
favsharia2 1 4 1.194 305 
Relnoinflnce 1 4 0.987 308 
Govtprotrelfreed 1 4 0.591 304 
 Relsep 1 4 1.191 306 
      
Level of education Educ 2 5 0.676 309 
     
Present occupational status  Currem 1 6 1.987 303 
     
Age  
 
age2 1 6 1.426 299 
     
Gender  
 
Gender 1 2 0.417 304 
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Table 3. Internet use and the propensity for non-internet political activity during the Tunisian Revolution 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Internet used for protest 
activities 
.088*** .086*** .084*** .076*** .075*** .074*** 
 (6.99) (6.82) (6.59) (5.88) (5.83) (5.61) 
       
Opposition to Ben Ali regime  .103** .131*** .151*** .152*** .152*** 
  (3.33) (4.08) (4.55) (4.60) (4.57) 
       
Weak sense of political efficacy 
(pre-revolution) 
  -.117** -.120** -.120** -.119** 
   (-3.34) (-3.31) (-3.32) (-3.24) 
       
Support for conservative 
religious views 
   -.036* -.042* -.043* 
    (-2.25) (-2.59) (-2.58) 
       
Level of education     -.220* -.216* 
     (-2.40) (-2.27) 
       
Present occupational status      .007 
      (0.20) 
       
Age .057 .055 .025 .019 .015 .025 
 (1.36) (1.29) (0.57) (0.43) (0.35) (0.50) 
       
Gender .077 .075 .102 .094 .142 .140 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.70) (0.63) (0.95) (0.93) 
       
N
 
290 290 290 286 286 281 
X
2
 50.04*** 61.17*** 72.32*** 76.14*** 81.93*** 79.62*** 
Pseudo R
2 
.037 .045 .053 .057 .061 .060 
Order-probit parameter estimations; Z scores in parentheses; * p<.05 ** p <.01*** p < .001 
 
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
 
 
Economy 
(Economy, jobs, income distribution and corruption) 
 
 
Rights and freedoms 
(Press, speech and general state of rights) 
 
Figure 1. Levels of opposition to the Ben Ali Regime 
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
 
 
Internet use for protest-related activities 
(discussion, searches, sharing) 
 
 
Protest activity 
(demonstration, leafleting, displaying political 
messages, discussion) 
 
Figure 2. Internet use for protest-related activities and protest activities during the revolution 

 
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  Level of protest activity 
 
 
  Low High Total 
 
 
Level of internet use 
 
Low 
17 
(48.6%) 
 
51 
(17.8%) 
68 
(21.1%) 
 
High 
18 
(51.4%) 
 
236 
(82.2%) 
254 
(78.9%) 
  
Total 
35 
(100%) 
 
287 
(100%) 
322 
(100%) 
  χ
2
 = 17.767; p < .001 
 
Figure 3. Cross-tabulation of internet use and protest activity 
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Annex 1: On-line convenience sample and socio-demographics in Tunisia 
The sample that resulted from our on-line awareness and promotion is relatively old 
compared to the general Tunisian population with 21.9% of respondents born in the 1970s, 
38.2% in the 1980s, and 9.9% born in the 1990s. The corresponding age distribution as 
percentage of total population in 2010 is as follows: 15.6% born in the 1970s, 18.4% born in 
the 1980s, and 16.8% born in the 1990s 16.8% (United States Census Bureau).  Altogether, 
the mean age is 36 years old. With 77.6% of male respondents, the sample studied here is 
clearly more male-dominated than Tunisia’s total population (50 % males, World Bank 2011) 
and also more male than the country’s Facebook population (58.0%; see 
www.socialbakers.com).  
The sample population is also relatively highly educated with 49.8% of respondents holding a 
Bachelor and 37.0% a graduate degree, compared to the Tunisian population in general 
where the gross tertiary enrollment ratio is 28,6% (UNESCO 2010) and the gross tertiary 
completion ratio  6.2% (African Economic Outlook 2012). The majority of respondents in this 
sample are medium to heavy users of the Internet with 28.3% reporting a daily Internet use 
of 3-4 hours and another 43.6% reporting daily Internet use of more than 5 hours per day. 
To set this roughly into proportion with the Internet usage patterns of the general Tunisian 
population: According the the ITU household survey of 2010, only 17.1 % of individuals over 
the age of ten had accessed the Internet in the past 12 months. Network embeddedness 
among these respondents is also relatively high. 98.5% indicated Facebook as their most 
important online social network, and 65.4% reported having more than 200 friends on their 
most important network, which is well above the worldwide average (The average number 
of “friends” in a Facebook network is 130). Though not generalizable on these features to 
the larger Tunisian population, the sample does provide valuable insights into a subset of 
Page 42 of 46
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fdem  Email: Aurel.Croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de;Jeffhaynes106868@aol.com
Democratization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Tunisian citizens previously shown to have been well educated, digitally literate, and socially 
interconnected.  
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Annex 2: Further details on key variables 
Offline protest activities 
Below is a list of different forms of political action that people may undertake offline in their real life. For 
each of these activities please tell us whether between December 2010 and January 2011 you engaged or 
considered engaging in one of these activities (question 18 a –d; variables 76 - 79). 
Discussing the political situation face to face with relatives, friends, colleagues, or neighbors 
Wearing a button, sign, or sticker with a political message 
Distributing political information material (leaflets, brochures etc) 
 
Participating in demonstrations 
These were responses were summed to create a scale of offline protest activities (variable 132 polact ) 
Internet used for protest activities 
Thinking about different activities that people can perform on the Internet in relation to politics, please 
indicate in which of them you engaged and how often during the revolution (question 15 a – g; variables 56 - 
62) 
Discuss online/ Chat about the political situation and its causes with unknown people 
Search for information about the protest movement and related events in other parts of the country 
Search for information about the protest movement and related events in my own city/town/municipality 
Share/distribute information about the protest movement and related events with friends/relatives/neighbors/colleagues 
Share/distribute information with unknown people living inside Tunisia 
Share/distribute information with people living outside Tunisia 
The original question ordered responses 1 = once 2 = Several times 3 = Often 4 = Never 
These were recoded so that the response order was 1=Never 2 = Once 3 = Several times 4 = Often (variables 125-131) and then summed 
(variable 136 internetusepro) 
Opposition to Ben Ali regime 
Respondents views towards Ben Ali Regime’s policies (govsup) 
First of all, how well or badly would you say the government of Ben Ali was at handling the following 
matters? (Question 1 a –d; variables 3 – 6) 
How effectively did government narrow gap between rich and poor (govredist) 
How effectively did government create jobs (govmakjobs) 
How effectively did government manage economy (govmanecon) 
How effectively did government combat corruption (govanticorr) 
Responses were coded  1 = very good 2 = good 3 = bad 4 = very bad ie from strong to weak support  and summed (variable 133 govsup) 
Rights and Freedoms (rightsscale) 
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Under the government of Ben Ali, to what extent do you think were the following freedoms guaranteed in 
Tunisia? (question 3 a -  b) 
Freedom of speech 
Freedom of press 
How much would you agree to the following statements: (question 4 a – b) 
When having contact with the police I was always treated with respect 
The police respected people’s rights 
 
Weak sense of political efficacy before revolution 
how much would you agree to the following statements? (Question 6 a – c; variables 14 – 16) 
Prior to the revolution, people like me could influence the way in which political decisions were taken in Tunisia 
Prior to the revolution I felt well informed about the political situation in Tunisia and I felt sufficiently informed to discuss politics with 
other people. 
I felt confident to freely discuss the political situation in Tunisia with other people.  
Responses were coded 1 = agree strongly 2 = agree 3 = disagree 4 = disagree strongly ie from strong to weak sense of political efficacy 
and summed (variable 141 polefficprerev) 
Support for conservative religious views 
People think differently about how politics and religion should relate. For each of the following statements 
please tell us how muchyou agree or disagree (Question26 a to e; variables 26 a – e) 
a. Religious leaders should not influence government (relnoinflnce) 
b. It would be better for Tunisia if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (relinoff) 
c. The government should protect religious freedom (govtptotrelfreed) 
d. Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socioeconomic life (relsep) 
e. The government should make laws according to Islamic law / the laws of the shari´a (favsharia) 
Responses went from 1=  agree strongly 2 = agree 3 = disagree 4 =   disagree strongly 
The responses to b. and e. were recoded ( b - relinoff2 variable 137; e – favsharia2 variable 138) )  so that all responses ran from liberal 
to conservative; the responses were then summed religviews variable 139) 
Level of education 
What is your highest completed educational level 
a. Primary School 
b. Secondary School (college) 
c. Preparatory School (lycée) 
d. DEUPC (Diplôme d'études universitaires de premier DEUPC (Diplôme d'études universitaires de premier cycle) or DUT 
(diplôme d'études universitaires technologiques, or DUT)  
e. Doctorate, DESS or DEA  (Diplôme d'Études Approfondies) 
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Present occupational status (curremp) 
Age (age2)
Gender (gender) 
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